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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL WORLD
ARTHUR LEAVENSt
Introduction
Like it or not, technology has profoundly changed the way we relate to
one another and to our government. If electronic technology once played a
supportive role in our lives, a take-it-or-leave-it tool of convenience, that is
no longer so. In the digital age, technology is inescapably woven into the
fabric of our lives, bringing with it a vastly enhanced capability of the
government to surveil the citizenry. Not only does the government have
increasingly powerful surveillance tools, but the citizens themselves -
wittingly or not - in large measure have enabled surveillance by using
technology that exposes a wide swath of information that most would
regard as quintessentially private. Any doubt in this regard was dispelled
by the summer 2013 disclosures concerning the on-going surveillance by
the National Security Agency. We learned that the government has the
capacity to collect and instantly analyze huge amounts of data - e.g., phone
records, cell-phone GPS data, credit-card transactions, E-Z pass usage - to
identify persons wherever they may be and to track and record their
activities and precise locations (in some instances right down to the specific
floor of a building), all without ever seeing or listening to them.l That may
be a comfort - we are told of terrorist plots thus foiled, lives thus saved; 2
however, it is surely a concern. But whether we are comforted, concerned,
or both, these revelations underscore the need for clear normative
boundaries for such surveillance.
t Professor of Law Emeritus, Western New England University School of Law. I would like to thank
my colleagues Giovanna Shay, Bruce Miller, Julie Steiner, Sudha Setty, Matthew Charity, Ren6 Reich-
Graefe and Barbara Noah for their encouragement and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this
article and Dean Art Gaudio for providing support and assistance for this project. I would also like to
thank the Ronald H. Brown Center for Civil Rights and Economic Development and the Journal of
Civil Rights and Economic Development for inviting me to participate in its symposium, Criminal
Justice in the 21 st Century: The Challenge to Protect Individual Freedoms, Civil Rights and Our Safety.
1 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, How the U.S. Uses Technology to Mine More Data More
Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at 1, 11.
2 See Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger & Charlie Savage, Mining of Data is Called Crucial to Fight
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2013, at AI, A11.
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Of course, state and federal governments can, and to some extent do,
police themselves through statutes3 and regulations. 4 However, as a federal
constitutional matter, the Fourth Amendment provides the sole protection,
one crafted over 200 years ago in response to the concerns of a very
different world. On its face, the amendment strikes the balance between
governmental surveillance and our right to be free from it in a concise,
straightforward way, protecting us in our "persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." 5 The critical question
is: how does this ancient construct work in the face of burgeoning,
constantly evolving technology?
Fourth Amendment protection, of course, has two components -
coverage and content. The two are obviously related, but the threshold
issue is coverage, without which there is no protection. On its face, Fourth
Amendment coverage is limited to "searches and seizures," and so, for a
particular mode of surveillance to be subject to the amendment's
reasonableness requirement, it must be a "search." 6 The Supreme Court
first addressed the question of whether electronic surveillance constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search in Olmstead v. United States, 7 the Court holding
that a wiretap of a home telephone was not a search because there was no
physical intrusion into the home. This property-based approach to Fourth
3 For example, as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.),
Congress enacted comprehensive statutory regulation of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping in
what has come to be known as Title III, subsequently upgraded in the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified 18 U.S.C. §§1367, 2232, 2510 -2521,
2701-2710, 3121-3126). States, too, have enacted statutory limits on police investigatory practices.
E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 1 (2013) (limiting evidentiary searches incident to arrest to
"fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been
made").
4 E.g., New York City Police Department Public Security Privacy Guidelines (Apr. 2, 2009),
available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crimejprevention/publicsecurity_privacy_guidelines.pd
f.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
6 A few courts have analyzed some modes of electronic surveillance as "seizures," see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 396-370 (Mass. 2009) (holding, under the state's Fourth
Amendment analog, that police installation and monitoring of a GPS device on defendant's vehicle
constituted a seizure of the vehicle), but most courts have rejected this construction of the word
"seizure," reasoning that, if a mode of surveillance is subject to Fourth Amendment coverage, it is
because it is a "search." See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007) (observing
that police, by attaching a GPS to an automobile and then monitoring it, "did not 'seize' the car in any
intelligible sense of the word"). See also United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding
that "the Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to
monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search"').
7 277 U.S. 438, 455, 462 (1928).
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Amendment coverage continued for some 40 years8 until the landmark
decision in Katz v. United States,9 in which the Court changed course,
announcing that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."0 In
his concurrence, Justice Harlan reduced that broad statement of the
amendment's purpose to the familiar test that, in large measure, still defines
the reach of the amendment's protection, asking whether a challenged
investigative technique intrudes upon a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy.11 If it does, it is a "search" subject to the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that it be reasonable; if it does not, it is not a "search," leaving
the police free to employ that mode of investigation without any
justification at all.12 In this essay, I argue that this privacy-based test has
led us astray, offering inevitably shrinking protection in our digital world
where the line between what is private and what is public is rapidly
disappearing. Said another way, Katz has created a trap, putting Fourth
Amendment protection at the mercy of technological advances instead of
the other way around.
What, then, ought to mark the normative bounds of Fourth Amendment
protection? I suggest a return to the amendment's text, not as a way to
cabin its reach to that which the framers might have intended or imagined
over 200 years ago, but as the appropriate and enduring measure of its
reach. The amendment should apply, I argue, to any governmental search,
that is, any investigative technique aimed at gathering information, without
regard to whether the targeted information is in some sense public and thus
not private. Only this approach will ensure that, as technology continues to
evolve, the amendment maintains its appropriate normative force, i.e.,
protecting the people against unreasonable governmental surveillance.
This approach would almost certainly broaden the amendment's coverage,
requiring the re-thinking of how we decide what is reasonable. But
whatever the challenges, one thing is clear - in today's digital world, we
cannot intelligibly balance the government's need to investigate and
8 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-512 (1961) (holding that a spike
microphone inserted through an exterior wall to detect conversations in an apartment, while not a
technical trespass, constituted a search because it intruded into the protected space).
9 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10 Id.at351.
11 Id. at 361. But see Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (reaffirming its holding in
Jones, supra note 6, that, in addition to governmental intrusions that are "searches" under the Katz test,
"[w]hen 'the Government obtains information by physically intruding' on persons, houses, papers, or
effects, 'a "search" within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment' has 'undoubtedly
occurred."').
12 As noted above, supra note 11, this assumes that the governmental intrusion in question is not a
physical intrusion upon the person, house, papers or effects of the suspect for the purpose of gathering
information. If it is, it constitutes a Fourth Amendment search whether or not it violated the suspect's
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1414.
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prevent crimes against the people's right to be free from investigative
overreach unless surveillance, all surveillance, is subject to this Fourth
Amendment calculus.
My argument has four parts.
First, I take a quick look at Katz's privacy-based approach to Fourth
Amendment coverage, surveying the journey from its hopeful beginning to
the apparent dead-end at which now find ourselves.
Second, I examine the three 2lSt-century cases, Kyllo,13 Quon,14 and
Jones,15 in which the Supreme Court has wrestled with the application of
the Katz test to surveillance involving some form of advanced technology.
These cases demonstrate the shortcomings of using privacy to measure
Fourth Amendment coverage but offer no solution.
Third, I argue that Katz has run its course. Rather than trying to cobble
together a fix to its privacy-based test of Fourth Amendment coverage, we
should return to the amendment's text, interpreting "searches" to include all
investigative techniques aimed at gathering information, thus subjecting all
governmental surveillance to the amendment's reasonableness mandate.
Indeed, I suggest that the Court may already be doing this, in effect
employing the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test not as a measure
of Fourth Amendment coverage, but instead, as a threshold test of
reasonableness, sorting out those less intrusive searches that are per se
reasonable from those that are sufficiently intrusive to require particular
justification, presumptively a warrant. A sort of Fourth Amendment triage.
This, I argue, is at best a clumsy, inapt way to deal with the difficult issues
raised by modem surveillance; at worst, it is a disingenuous, flawed
approach that utilizes the wrong metric in its threshold reasonableness
determination. The amendment is not meant to protect privacy as such.
The right that the Fourth Amendment protects is the right to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusions into our personal affairs, without
regard to whether our personal information might somehow be public, not
private.
Finally, recognizing that my suggested approach will expand the reach of
the Fourth Amendment, I offer some tentative thoughts, as well as cautions,
concerning the impact of this expansion on the presumption that to be
reasonable, a search must be supported by a warrant. This is a very
complex issue, fraught with potential danger, and a full analysis of this
question is well beyond the scope of this article.
13 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
14 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S.746 (2010).
15 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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I. THE PRIVACY-BASED APPROACH TO FOURTH AMENDMENT
COVERAGE
As noted, Katz itself was the 2 0th century's answer to the how the Fourth
Amendment applies to new technology, specifically, electronic monitoring
of telephone conversations. Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court had taken a
trespassory, property-based view of Fourth Amendment coverage, insisting
that to be a search, a mode of surveillance had to physically intrude into a
protected area. 16  This approach exempted wiretaps from Fourth
Amendment coverage.1 7 In Katz, the police had attached a microphone to
the top of a phone booth and listened in on Katz's end of telephone
conversations on the pay phone in that booth. Although the case was
relatively easy as the law then stood - the microphone sat on, but did not
physically intrude into, the phone booth - the Court sought to chart a new
course, one not dependent on property concepts, announcing that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."1 8 As welcome as this
conceptual pivot may have been, its implementation - the now-familiar
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test announced by Justice Harlan in his
concurrence - carried the seeds of its own destruction.
First, in his majority opinion Justice Stewart went out of his way to say
that the Fourth Amendment does not establish a general right of privacy,
stating that while privacy is an important consideration, the amendment in
many applications goes beyond privacy protection.19  However, the
operative rule formulated by Justice Harlan was explicitly grounded in
privacy, requiring both an actual and "reasonable" expectation of privacy
as a predicate for protection.
Second, while it later became clear that this "reasonable expectation of
privacy" was intended as a normative expectation, 20 it was far from clear
what principles should guide the Court in shaping its contours and then
applying it. Mindful of the trap of circularity - that is, a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" has to be something other than what the justices,
16 As noted above, see supra note 11, the Supreme Court has recently resurrected this test, holding
that the Katz test was meant to supplement, not displace, the physical-intrusion approach to Fourth
Amendment coverage. See Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1414 ("[T]hough Katz may add to the baseline [of
Fourth Amendment coverage], it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections 'when
the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area') (bracketed
substitution within interior quote in original).
17 Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928) (holding a wiretap was not a
search because there was no physical intrusion into the house) with Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (holding physical intrusion into apartment, a spike microphone inserted
through an exterior wall, constituted a search even though it intruded less than an inch).
18 Katz, 389 U.S. at351.
19 Seeid. at 350.
20 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
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without more, proclaim to be reasonable or legitimate - the Court has on
many occasions stated that it looks outside the Fourth Amendment in
making this normative judgment.21 Again a good idea. But, perhaps
inevitably, when the cases get decided, that outside source often seems
little more than the intuitive judgment of the Court concerning the way the
world works, or at least ought to work.
Third, at the same time the Court in Katz appeared to chart a new course
in defining the reach of the amendment, it hardened its commitment to the
presumption of a warrant with its requirement of probable cause as the
definition of "reasonable," the substantive measure of Fourth Amendment
protection. Although facially adding to the protection provided by the
amendment, as it worked out, this warrant presumption may well have
hobbled the development of Fourth Amendment protection. Over the
years, as the Court applied the Katz test to determine the amendment's
reach, it plainly has been mindful that to hold a particular surveillance
technique is a search will presumptively require a warrant (or at least
probable cause) to satisfy the amendment's requirement that the search be
reasonable. 22 Indeed, as one surveys the Court's application of the Katz
test over the years, it seems increasingly driven by the doctrinal rigidity of
the warrant presumption.
Consider these examples, roughly categorized by the kind of information
sought.
A. Information Exposed to a Third Party
In United States v. Miller,23 the Court held that grand-jury subpoenas
requiring a bank to hand over a person's financial records were not Fourth
Amendment searches because the bank customer voluntarily conveyed that
financial information to bank employees and thus had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in it.24 That the customer had to disclose this
quintessentially private information to the bank in order to use the bank's
services, that the information was disclosed for a quite limited purpose (and
perhaps with the understanding that it was otherwise confidential), and that
the federal Bank Secrecy Act 25 required the bank to keep those records,
were all quite beside the point. Using a similar third-party-exposure
21 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).
22 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
23 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
24 Id. at 443.
25 Pub. L. No. 91-508, Stat. 1114-1124 (1970) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959).
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theory, in Smith v. Maryland,26 the Court held that installing a pen register
at the telephone company and using it to learn the telephone numbers
called from a private telephone was not a search because the numbers
called were revealed - necessarily to be sure - to a third party (the phone
company) and thus were not private. 27
Smith is still good law, and it would seem to exclude from Fourth
Amendment coverage much if not all of the National Security Agency's
collection of so-called metadata, e.g., records of phone calls (showing the
date, time and duration of the calls; the phone numbers, and oft-times the
locations, of the callers and those called), credit-card transactions (showing
what one bought; when, where and from whom one bought it; how much
one paid for it) and the like.28 Such metadata - all (as was so in Smith)
disclosed to service providers; none involving the content of any
communications 29 - are, in the words of one privacy advocate, "often more
significant than the communications [themselves]." 30
B. Information Exposed to the Public
In United States v. Knotts,31 the Court held that putting a beeper into
container of chloroform (used in manufacturing illicit drugs), selling it
26 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
27 Id. at 743-45.
28 This, indeed, was the Obama Administration's formal defense of this surveillance. See
Administration White Paper Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, August 9, 2013, at 19-20 (citing Smith and Miller in support of its argument that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in such data), available at www.info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-
NSABulkCollection.pdf. The lower courts that have addressed this issue have split. Compare Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F.Supp. 2d 724, 750-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Smith in holding
that the NSA collection of telephony metadata does not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment and thus does not violate the amendment) with Klayman v. Ohama, 957 F.Supp. 2d 1, 32-
37, 38-41 (D.D.C.) (distinguishing Smith in holding that the NSA bulk collection of telephony metadata
constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search" and further finding that the plaintiffs, who seek injunctive
relief, have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing on their claim that this search is
unreasonable and thus unlawful under the Fourth Amendment).
29 See Peter Baker & David Sanger, Obama Defends Mining of Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2013, at
AlI (quoting President Obama's response to criticisms of this surveillance program, the president
saying, "Nobody is listening to your telephone calls .., that is not what this program is about."); James
Risen & Eric Lichtblau, How the U.S. Uses Technology to Mine Data More Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2013, at 1, 11 (describing the information collected and its analysis); Hendrick Hertzberg, Snoop
Scoops, THE NEW YORKER, June 24, 2013, at 3 (describing the information collected), available at
www.newyorker.com/talk/2013/130624taco-talk-hetrzberg.
30 Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, quoted in
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, How the U.S. Uses Technology to Mine Data More Quickly, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2013, at 11. Mr. Rotenberg may well be correct in his assessment of the importance of such
data, but, at least as matters now stand, he seems guilty of wishful thinking when he goes on to
conclude that "It is a bit of a fantasy to think that the government can seize so much information
without implicating the Fourth Amendment interests of American citizens." Id. Under Smith, that
fantasy is reality.
31 460 U.S. 276(1983).
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undercover to a drug suspect and then monitoring the beeper to track the
suspect's movements as he traveled over 100 miles through two states to a
remote cabin in the woods was not a search because there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in travel upon public roads. The Court
reasoned that the suspect had knowingly exposed his whereabouts to
anyone who happened to be on or next to the highway, no matter how
circuitous or remote his route, and his movements were thus public
information. 32 This was so even though the officers themselves needed the
beeper to keep track of the suspect. 33 A different sort of public exposure
was involved in California v. Greenwood,34 a case in which the Court held
that ripping open an opaque bag of trash, left at the curb for trash
collection, and rummaging through its contents was somehow not a search.
The Court's rationale was that a garbage bag at the curb was exposed to
raccoons, snoops, children and other noxious beasts who might tear it open,
revealing its contents for all to see. 35 As such, any expectation by the bag's
owner that its contents would remain free from public scrutiny was not
reasonable. Well, maybe.
C. Information Obtained by Aerial Surveillance
In California v. Ciraolo,36 the Court held that even though a homeowner
had enclosed his patio in not one, but two, privacy fences (one seven feet
tall, one ten feet tall), he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in that patio, at least when observed by a police-surveillance aircraft - a
precursor to a drone, I suppose. After all, the Court reasoned, the air above
that patio was navigable space open to the public, and anyone in an
overflying aircraft could see what the police saw from theirs.37 In a
companion case, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,3 8 the Court held that
aerial photographs of a secure area surrounding an industrial facility were
32 Id. at 281-285.
33 Id. at 278.
34 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
35 Id. at 40-41.
36 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
37 Id. at 213-214. Three years later, the Court took a slight step back in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445 (1989). In Riley, the Court held that backyard surveillance of a greenhouse by a police helicopter
hovering at 400 feet was not a search because it did not intrude upon any reasonable expectation of
privacy, id. at 450-451, but Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence provided the necessary fifth vote,
opined that the reasonableness of the privacy expectation depended not on what FAA regulations
permitted but what was the ordinary practice of private helicopter pilots. If the public ordinarily
hovered above Mr. Riley's greenhouse at 400 feet, so, too, could the police without violating his
reasonable expectation of privacy; if not, then this surveillance did intrude upon his reasonable
expectation of privacy and thus constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Id. at 454-455 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
38 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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not searches even though a sophisticated mapping camera was necessary to
reveal the detailed images revealed in the photos. 39 Here, the Court
reasoned that, despite the factory owner's considerable - and largely
successful - efforts to keep unwelcome intruders out of its enclosed
industrial complex, this secure area was akin to open fields40 and thus open
to aerial observation by those in "public airspace ... sufficiently near the
area for the reach of cameras." 4 1
D. Information Shared with a "False Friend"
In Hoffa v. United States,42 a case that preceded Katz by a few months,
the Court held that employing an undercover informant to converse with a
suspect in the suspect's hotel suite was not a search. According to the
Court, the suspect had assumed the risk that his fellow conversationalist
would reveal that conversation to others, and he thus could claim no Fourth
Amendment protection for what he said.43 In United States v. White,4 4 a
case that caused Justice Harlan himself to cry foul, 4 5 the Court relied on
Katz to reaffirm this false-friend approach to the contents of ostensibly
private conversations, indeed, going beyond Hoffa to hold that attaching a
wire to the informant to allow agents to listen in on a suspect's
conversations in his own home was not a search. The Court reasoned that
people assume the risk that someone to whom one says something, no
matter where that occurs or what is said, might be a wired informant
transmitting that conversation to the police.46 If we did not know that
before White, we certainly do after.
Each of these holdings, and others like them, facially rest on the notion
that the subjects' respective expectations of privacy - in the bank records,
in the telephone numbers called, in the movements of one's car, in the
bagged trash, in the fenced patio, in the conversation with a supposed
friend - were not reasonable. These judgments, ostensibly grounded in
common societal understandings (what one commentator has called
39 Id. at 238 & n. 5.
40 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (holding that trespassing on privately
owned, fenced, open fields is not a search); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (same).
41 Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239.
42 385 U.S. 293 (1967).
43 Id. at 302-303.
44 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
45 Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the question was not whether the suspect had
assumed the risk that his false friend was wearing a wire, but whether, through intrusions by
governmental agents, "we should impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement").
46 Id. at 751-753.
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empiricism without empirics47), are normative, insulating particular
investigative techniques from judicial scrutiny concerning their
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
It could be that these normative judgments are what they purport to be:
objective measures (however questionable one or another may be) of how
people view particular claims of privacy. When we put out our trash, we
understand that there is a good chance someone or something will rip open
the bag, exposing its contents for the world to see; when we open and
maintain a bank account, we take the risk that bank employees will reveal
to others the personal financial information that we necessarily convey to
them and that federal law requires them to keep; and so forth. Because we
have a common understanding that such information is not really private,
police intrusions to discover it are not investigative techniques about which
we should be concerned. But just gauging from the reactions of my
students over the past 30 years, if the Katz test is really an empirical
measure of societal attitudes, the Court is astonishingly tone deaf in many
of these judgments. A darker view is that this is faux empiricism,
pretending to ground in sources outside the Fourth Amendment the Court's
own judgment that particular privacy interests are not worthy of Fourth
Amendment protection. Justice Scalia has on occasion taken this more
cynical view of the Katz test, noting in his concurrence in Minnesota v.
Carter48 what he called the "uncanny resemblance" of society's reasonable
expectations of privacy to the views of the sitting justices. 49
As problematic as these issues concerning the Katz approach may seem,
they may be cosmetic compared to what the future might hold. The Katz
privacy test may, on occasion, have come up short in protecting people, not
places, but at least it seemed a defensible way to think about Fourth
Amendment values in the face of emerging 20 th century technology -
wiretaps, microphones that allowed listening through walls, airplanes that
permitted aerial over-flight, beepers that permitted crude tracking of public
travel. The Court may not have gotten it right in assessing particular
intrusions, but at least Justice Harlan's notion that privacy - a settled
concept - lay at the heart of the matter seemed right. That is no longer so.
Today's (not to mention tomorrow's) technology has put expectations of
privacy in flux, if not threatening privacy altogether. As such, using a
privacy-based test to establish the reach of Fourth Amendment protection is
47 See Stephen Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party
Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH 431, 440-441 (2013).
48 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998).
49 Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (conceding
the potential for this "degree of circularity" in the Katz expectation-of-privacy test).
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not just outmoded; it risks stripping away our constitutional protection
against over-reaching governmental surveillance. If that sounds
hyperbolic, consider the evidence.
II. KYLLO, QUON, AND JONES: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF KATZ LAID BARE
The Supreme Court has certainly been aware of technology's impact on
privacy and thus on the Katz test,50 yet the justices have not rushed to fill
the gap. Even though surveillance technology has exploded since the turn
of the 21st century - roughly the beginning of the so-called digital age5 1 -
the Court has confronted its impact on Fourth Amendment coverage in only
three cases. 52 Moreover, only in the first of these cases, Kyllo v. United
States,53 did the Court apply the Katz test to decide the amendment's reach.
In the latter two, the Court avoided the Katz issue, exhibiting open
discomfort with its privacy-based test.
Kyllo involved thermal imaging of a home, a relatively crude technology
by which police scanned the roof of a house and measured its infrared
emissions, thereby determining that one part of the roof was significantly
warmer than the rest. This temperature differential suggested that there
was indoor plant cultivation in the house, and that information played an
essential role in the issuance of a search warrant that uncovered a
marijuana-growing operation. The validity of the warrant thus depended
on the lawfulness of the warrantless thermal scan. If the scan was a search,
it (and the warrant) would be unlawful under the Fourth Amendment,
because the scan was conducted without a warrant. If the scan was not a
search, the Fourth Amendment and its warrant requirement would not
apply, and the warrant would stand. Everything depended on whether the
50 As Justice Scalia put it, writing for the Court in Kyllo, the first of the Court's digital-age
encounters with technological surveillance, there a thermal scan of a house: "It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology. ... The question we confront today is what limits there are
upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." 533 U.S. at 33-34.
51 See Eric Schmidt & Jared Cohen, The New Digital Age 4 (2013) ("In the first decade of the
twenty-first century the number of people connected to the Internet worldwide increased from 350
million to more than 2 billion. In the same period, the number of mobile-phone subscribers rose from
750 million to well over 5 billion (it is now over 6 billion).").
52 In Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014), the Court addressed the question of whether the
vast amount of digital data in a cell phone could be searched without a warrant as part of a search
incident to arrest, holding that "officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting such a
search." Id. at 2485. While this holding answered an important question concerning the Fourth
Amendment's application to digital information, it did not involve the question here at issue: whether
surveillance employing digital technology constitutes a "search" and thus is covered by the amendment.
In Riley, there was no question but that the data in the cell phone, the digital version of "papers" or
"effects", was protected by the Fourth Amendment; the question there was whether the cell-phone
search that uncovered it required a warrant.
53 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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thermal scan was a Fourth Amendment search.
In deciding this question, the Court applied the two-pronged Katz test,
deciding that Kyllo had both an actual and reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information that the thermal scan revealed and thus that the
scan constituted a Fourth Amendment search which was unlawful in the
absence of a warrant. 54 Although Justice Scalia's majority opinion was a
full-throated affirmation of core Fourth Amendment values in the face of
emergent technology, the Court qualified this protection by limiting it to
technological surveillance through use of "a device not in general public
use." 55 This followed from Katz.56 Once people generally can use thermal
scanners to enhance their vision and thus see the temperature of your roof,
you cannot reasonably complain if the police see what others see; that
information, as an objective matter, is no longer private.
It took only 12 years for technology to close the gap, apparently
eviscerating Kyllo's Fourth Amendment protection. A "Professional
Infrared Thermometer," advertised as capable of detecting surface
temperatures up to 3272F on a one-foot-square area up to 100 feet away, is
now commercially available. 57 Its advertised cost is $800, not a pittance to
be sure but far less expensive than the "conventional" $22,000 mapping
camera used to "enhance somewhat" the vision of the EPA photographer at
12,000 feet in Dow Chemical Co.58 If a sophisticated, expensive mapping
camera such as the one used by the government in its surveillance of Dow
was in general public use, thus disqualifying the resulting aerial
photographs as Fourth Amendment searches under Katz, so, too, are
advertised $800 infrared scanners, thus disqualifying thermal scans as
Fourth Amendment searches. For all of Justice Scalia's bark, 59 Kyllo's
54 Id. at 40.
55 Id.
56 In Justice Stewart's words, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. This idea
that the constable should not be required to ignore what all can see has roots tracing back to 18th
century tort law, holding that the policeman's eye can commit no trespass. See Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (cited by Justice Scalia and quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. 1029,
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)). It applies even when the policeman's vision is enhanced, as long as the
mode of that enhancement is generally available. See Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238 (holding that
photographs revealing detail as small as one-half inch in diameter, taken by a sophisticated but publicly
available mapping camera at altitudes up to 12,000 feet, did not constitute a search, observing that
"[t]he mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise
to constitutional problems.").
57 See IR-PRO USB Professional Infrared Thermometer, THERMOWORKS,
http://www.thermoworks.com/products/ir/ir_pro_100.html. The Supreme Court over-ruled by Costco,
where, as of June 1, 2013, a less sophisticated and far less expensive infrared thermometer was on the
shelf, available for purchase and use by the general public.
58 See supra note 56; Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 242 n. 4 (Powell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (noting the price and high-performance capabilities of the camera).
59 In framing the issue, Justice Scalia stated, "The question we confront today is what limits there
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Fourth Amendment protection turns out to have little bite.
In the second case, City of Ontario v. Quon,60 open cracks emerged in
the Court's confidence in Katz as an apt measure of Fourth Amendment
coverage. Quon involved a police-department supervisor's selective
retrieval and reading of a police officer's private text messages from an
electronic mobile device that the police department had issued to the officer
for use in his police work. The city had explicitly reserved the right to
audit the messages but informally had said it would not do so if the
employee paid for any overage, which the officer had done. To determine
whether reading the officer's private text messages in spite of this
assurance constituted a search, Katz required the Court to assess society's
privacy expectations in text messages sent and received on an employer's
mobile device. Eight justices threw up their hands, noting that while in
Katz their counterparts may have felt comfortable using their own
experience to assess the privacy interest in a telephone booth, they felt no
such confidence in this world of texting at the office. 6 1 After discussing at
some length the perils of deciding this issue before settled societal privacy
expectations in this context had emerged, the Court decided to leave the
matter for further fermentation, holding that even if such surveillance
constituted a search, it was reasonable.62
The Court's discomfort with the Katz test continued in United States v.
Jones,63 the most recent of these three cases. There, the Court was asked to
decide whether, by attaching a GPS device to Jones's car and then
monitoring it to determine and record the car's every movement for a
month, the police had engaged in a search under the Fourth Amendment. 64
Under Katz, the answer would lie in whether such surveillance intruded
are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
He underscored this point, declaring "the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems [of surveillance] that are already in use or in development." Id. at 36. When the government
argued that room temperature, revealed by infra-red scanning, is not a matter implicating privacy
interests, Justice Scalia responded, "In the home ... all details are intimate details, because the entire
area is held safe from prying government eyes." Id. at 37 (emphasis in original). He concluded:
[T]he Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the house.' That line, we
think, must be not only firm but also bright - which requires clear specification of those
methods of surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly possible to conclude
from the videotape of the thermal imaging that occurred in this case that no 'significant'
compromise of the homeowner's privacy has occurred, we must take the long view, from
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.
Id. at 40 (citation omitted). That firm, bright line of protection against technological advances in
surveillance, drawn at the home's threshold and dictated by the "long view," seems to have lasted just
12 years.
60 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
61 Id. at 760.
62 Id. at 764-65.
63 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
64 132 S.Ct. at949.
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upon the suspect's reasonable expectation of privacy, a question that the
Court again side-stepped. Writing for a four-judge plurality, joined on this
point by Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence, Justice Scalia seemed to
turn back the clock, resurrecting the trespass-to-property approach that
Katz was thought to have put to rest. The Court held that attaching the
GPS device to Jones's car and monitoring it to determine the car's
movements was a trespassory intrusion upon private property for the
purpose of obtaining information, which constituted a "search." 6 5 Since this
search was of Jones's car, an "effect," it was covered by the Fourth
Amendment and was thus unlawful in the absence of a valid search
warrant.66
In reaching this result, Justice Scalia explained that the Katz test of
Fourth Amendment coverage augmented but did not replace original
understandings concerning the amendment's reach, which includes
physical intrusions into constitutionally protected areas by the government
in order to obtain information. Whether or not this was a fair statement of
Fourth Amendment doctrine, such a property-based approach covers only a
narrow slice of electronic, particularly digital, surveillance. If the GPS
device in Jones had been built into the car (as opposed to attached by the
police), monitoring the device would not have involved a physical trespass
upon Jones's property, leaving it to the Katz test to determine if monitoring
the GPS, by itself, would have constituted a cognizable Fourth Amendment
search. The justices of course understood this point. 67 But, it is one thing
to see the problem and quite another to agree on a solution, as the opinions
in Jones demonstrate. Five justices agreed that Katz would yield the same
result, but Justice Sotomayor could not bring herself to vote on that basis,
leaving the larger Katz issue for another day. A closer look at the case
justifies Justice Sotomayor's, and with her vote, the Court's reticence.
In Jones, a joint District of Columbia and FBI narcotics task force came
to suspect Antoine Jones of trafficking narcotics. The officers began an
extensive surveillance of Jones, including attaching a GPS device to his
65 132 S.Ct. at 950 & n. 3 (2012).
66 Holding that the warrantless tracking was unlawful, the Court explicitly declined to address the
government's fallback argument that, because its attachment and monitoring of the GPS device was
based on reasonable suspicion, indeed probable cause, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The argument was not raised below, and the Court thus considered it forfeited. 132 S.Ct. at 954.
67 See id. at 954 (Scalia, J., writing for the Court) (noting that surveillance without physical
trespass "may be ... an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to
answer that question"); id at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that "physical intrusion is now
unnecessary to many forms of surveillance," including "monitoring ... factory- or owner-installed
vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones"); id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that
the Court's reasoning does not apply to long-term monitoring without technical trespass, as for
example, monitoring of a GPS tracking device installed in an automobile by the manufacturer).
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wife's car, a car that Jones exclusively used. By monitoring that device
around the clock for four weeks, the police determined Jones's precise
movements during that time and were thus able to connect him with
locations and persons that other evidence tied to the narcotics scheme.
Although the police had obtained a warrant authorizing the attachment and
monitoring of the GPS device, the warrant only authorized its installation
in the District of Columbia within ten days of its issuance. The officers
attached the device to Jones's car 11 days after the warrant's issuance, and
in Maryland to boot. So, the government defended the GPS surveillance as
a warrantless intrusion, arguing that neither the installation nor the
monitoring constituted a search because neither violated Jones's reasonable
expectation of privacy.
Notwithstanding the Orwellian overtones of this argument, the
government stood on reasonably firm doctrinal ground. As noted above,68
in Knotts, the Court had held that because public travel was open to public
view, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's movements,
even if they occurred in remote locations. True, in Knotts, the Court had
reserved the issue of "dragnet type law enforcement practices," 69 but as
Chief Judge Sentelle put it in his dissent to the denial of a rehearing en
banc in Jones, if there is zero expectation of privacy in one public trip, then
"[t]he sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero." 70
There are two responses to this argument under Katz, but both have a
sort of patchwork feel, neither offering much guidance for its application
beyond the facts of Jones. First, as an empirical matter, there is a
difference between being tracked on a single trip and being tracked around
the clock for a month. Such prolonged, uninterrupted surveillance could
not, as a practical matter, be accomplished by conventional, visual
surveillance, and so most would agree as an objective matter that the
intensive, non-stop surveillance provided by GPS tracking is not something
we in society expect. In terms of the Katz test, we have an objectively
reasonable, actual expectation that our public comings and goings, minute-
by-minute for weeks on end, are as a practical matter private. As Justice
Stewart might have put it, we do not knowingly expose to the public a
month's worth of our precise whereabouts.
Turning to the normative prong of Katz, whether that expectation of
privacy is a "reasonable" or legitimate Fourth Amendment expectation, the
68 See supra notes 31-33 & accompanying text.
69 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
70 United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (2010) (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc), rev., 132 U.S. 945 (2012).
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detailed pattern of conduct that emerges from such prolonged surveillance
reveals a great deal of personal and private information about the person
subject to such surveillance - not just where he goes, but by "easy
inference," why he goes there - an informational "matrix" which reveals
more than the sum of the separate instances of travel it catalogs. We expect
that this "matrix" of information about the details of how we live is private,
and that expectation of privacy is "legitimate." It is thus protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Put more succinctly by Judge Wood in her dissent to
a Seventh Circuit case holding that GPS monitoring was not a search,
United States v. Cuevas-Perez,7 1 such a surveillance technique is
"Orwell[ian]," 7 2 or by Chief Judge Kozinski in his dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc in a similar Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Pineda-
Moreno,73 "creepy and un-American." 74
Justice Sotomayor took this argument to heart. In her concurrence, she
noted that "with increasing regularity" law enforcement will be able, on the
cheap, to "enlist[] factory- or owner-installed tracking devices" in cars and
in mobile phones to compile, to store and to have ready access to "a
precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious and
sexual associations." 75 She went on to observe that public awareness of
such unrestricted, govemmental surveillance would "chill[] associational
and expressive freedoms" 76 and could "'alter the relationship between
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.' 77
That law enforcement might theoretically be able to gain information
concerning a person's whereabouts by conventional surveillance - good
old-fashioned eyeballing - was for Justice Sotomayor entirely beside the
point in deciding whether under Katz the Fourth Amendment applied to
such technological surveillance. 78  For her, the potential for arbitrary
misuse by the government of such powerful technology raised Fourth
Amendment concerns quite apart from the availability of the same
information through traditional surveillance. Indeed, she went a step
further, suggesting that it is time to reconsider the so-called third-party
71 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011).
72 Id. at 286 (Wood, J., dissenting) ("[GPS surveillance] make[s] the system that George Orwell
depicted in his famous novel, 1984, seem clumsy and easily avoidable by comparison.").
73 617 F.3d 1120(9th Cir. 2010).
74 Id. at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
75 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
77 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 285 (Flaum, J.,
concurring)).
78 Id.
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doctrine under which information disclosed to a third party is deemed
exposed to the public and thus not subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy, thereby precluding Fourth Amendment protection. This doctrine,
as noted above, 79 provides the conceptual basis under Katz for denying
Fourth Amendment coverage to, among other things, phone numbers that
one dials on one's phone,80 the records concerning one's finances that
banks are required by law to keep,81 and presumably the phone-record and
credit-card metadata collected, analyzed and stored by the National
Security Agency. 82 Noting that people, often by necessity, reveal much
information about themselves in the course of day-to-day living, Justice
Sotomayor deemed this third-party limitation on Katz "ill-suited to the
digital age." 83 She suggested that information should not be denied Fourth
Amendment protection solely because it was disclosed, even voluntarily, to
another for some limited purpose.84
Nevertheless, reluctant to resolve these "difficult questions" when in her
view it was unnecessary to do so, 85 Justice Sotomayor joined Justice
Scalia's trespassory approach, thus providing the fifth vote for deciding the
case on that narrow basis.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Kagan, shed any such reluctance and took on the Katz issue. Justice
Alito began by dismissing Justice Scalia's trespass-to-chattels approach,
arguing that 181h century tort law is an inapt tool to measure the Fourth
Amendment's coverage of 2 1st century surveillance technology. 86 Not only
is it inconsistent with Katz - which, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's claim
to the contrary, had explicitly over-ruled this trespass-based theory87 - but
it also flies in the face of 45 years of case law that followed Katz. More to
the point, this reversion to the law of trespass as a measure of Fourth
Amendment protection has no application to electronic surveillance, which
requires no physical intrusion. This, of course, was the very problem that
the Court in Katz set out to solve. 88
Justice Alito conceded that Katz has its own problems, particularly as
applied to digital technology. He began by noting Katz's potential for
79 See supra notes 23-30 & accompanying text.
80 Smith, 422 U.S. at 743-45.
81 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
82 See supra notes 28-30 & accompanying text.
83 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring).
87 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
88 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 962.
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circularity and the related problem that judges may "confuse their own
expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to
which the Katz test looks."89 As noted above, this is not new. What is new,
that is, what differentiates the application of Katz's privacy-based test to
digital technology, is the direct connection between this technology and
societal privacy expectations. As Justice Alito observed, while the Katz
test assumes what he called a "well-developed and stable set of privacy
expectations," in our digital age societal privacy expectations change with
technological advances, often at dizzying speed, resulting in periods of flux
during which new expectations emerge, only to be replaced by yet newer,
and diminished, expectations spawned by the next generation of
technology. 90 Citing reports on NPR and in Time magazine, he noted the
apparent inevitability of this cycle:
New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the
expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff
worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution
of privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile
themselves to this development as inevitable. 9 1
Even assuming that at any given point in time there is a settled body of
privacy expectations, in today's world those expectations are increasingly a
function of technology, technology which - like it or not - is relentlessly
eroding privacy. In short, societal privacy expectations in today's world
present both a moving and a shrinking target.
As examples of this phenomenon, Justice Alito cataloged technology
that monitors persons' movements, pointing to the ubiquity of closed-
circuit video monitoring in some places, 92 automatic toll-collection systems
such as EZPass that record the movement of automobiles on toll roads,
GPS systems built into automobiles to assist roadside service or to track
stolen cars, and - what Justice Alito regarded as most significant - cell
phones and other mobile devices that permit wireless carriers to track and
record the minute-to-minute location of users, whether as a necessary
aspect of their operation or as social tools by which users advertise their
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 If it is ubiquitous in some locations in the United States, China - where, in addition to 20-plus
million government surveillance cameras, there is a proliferation of private surveillance cameras and
electronic listening devices enabling Chinese citizens to spy on each other - may well point the way of
the future. See Frank Langfitt, In China, The Government Isn't the Only Spy Game in Town, NPR, Jan.
30, 2013, available at http://www.npr.org/2013/01/30/170563866/in-china-the-govemment-isn't-the-
only-spy-game-in-town.
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location to promote interaction with (or sometimes to avoid) other users.93
And these examples are confined to location trackers; they say nothing
about the use of on-line purchasing or of credit cards, both of which reveal
what users buy, what they pay for it, and when and where they buy it, not
to mention digital social networks such as Facebook, in which users release
information that many would consider private.
This list is an incomplete but telling sample of today's technology,
technology which is only in its infancy.94 If today drones are the exclusive
province of the military, plans are in the works for a much less expensive
version that its developers hope soon to make a feature of everyday life.95
And it seems only a matter of time before there are surveillance drones so
small that they will be unnoticed, even indoors. 96 When that comes to pass,
will there be any space in which, as an objective matter, one would
reasonably expect to be free of surveillance? Will technology eventually
condition us to accept ubiquitous surveillance? Justice Alito suggested that
such concerns about shrinking privacy might spur action by state and
federal legislatures, which, he observed, could move more quickly and
effectively than could a court to identify privacy threats and to measure
public attitudes in order to institute statutory protections that could strike a
comprehensive, detailed balance of privacy and public safety (and that
could be adjusted as technology progresses). 9 7 As sensible as that seems,
neither Congress nor the various state legislatures has shown much appetite
for such a legislative solution.98
93 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at963.
94 For a more complete and colorful cataloging of available surveillance technology, see Chief
Judge Kozinski's list in his Pinedo-Moreno dissent. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1124-26 (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting).
95 See Matthew Wald, Domestic Drones on Patrol, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, at BI (describing
University of North Dakota's academic program in unmanned aviation, "preparing for a brave new
world in which cheap remote-controlled airplanes will be ubiquitous in civilian airspace").
96 AeroVironment, Inc., a developer and manufacturer of unmanned aircraft, has announced the
development of a fully operational hummingbird-like surveillance drone, flapping wings and all, in a
project funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. See Press Release,
AEROVIRONMENT, INC., AeroVironment Develops World's First Fully Operational Life-Size
Hummingbird-Like Unmanned Aircraft for DARPA, (Feb. 17, 2011) available at
http://www.avinc.com/resources/press release/aerovironmentdevelopsworlds first fullyoperational
-life-sized hummingbird. See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-a8ZbtZqH6Io.
97 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 962-63, 964.
98 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified 18 U.S.C. §§1367, 2232, 2510 -2521, 2701-2710, 3121-3126) (ECPA), places limits on law-
enforcement access to then-extant electronic communications, but 27 years of technological
development - including the advent of the so-called digital age - has opened holes in this statutory
protection. There have been attempts to update its protections, but the September-11-2001 terrorist
attacks undercut the political will for such upgrades, indeed, prompting national-security legislation
such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.), that weakened certain
privacy protections against surveillance. See Jason Krause, Prying Eyes, ABA J. 47 (April 2013)
(surveying shortcomings of, and attempts to amend, the ECPA). The most recent attempt at an ECPA
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Left with that reality, Justice Alito grudgingly turned to Katz, applying
its privacy-based test in a way that all but conceded its shortcomings as a
principled measure of Fourth Amendment coverage of electronic
surveillance. Justice Alito opined that the month-long, around-the-clock
GPS surveillance in Jones intruded on a reasonable expectation of privacy,
thus making it a "search," in contrast to the one-trip, 100-plus-mile beeper
surveillance which the Court in Knotts held was not. He offered no
supporting analysis, simply announcing, as if to say it makes it so, that four
weeks of tracking Jones's every vehicular movement "surely crossed"
Katz's privacy line. 99 Dismissing the criticism that he did not identify the
line's location, or even offer any principled way to find it, Justice Alito said
that if uncertainty exists, police could always obtain a search warrant. That
blithe assertion is by itself telling, coming from the four justices willing to
employ Katz to mark the foundational, protective boundary between the
government and its citizens in this context. If that were not enough, Justice
Alito added further uncertainty, suggesting that investigations involving
"extraordinary offenses" may well be subject to a different set of
reasonable privacy expectations,lOO a different line (if any line at all).
It may be that Justice Alito is an unenthusiastic, unworthy champion of the
Katz standard, but he identifies serious problems with its approach. The
more likely reality is that the standard itself has run its course. As noted
above, in her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor seems committed to
refurbishing the Katz test, suggesting among other possibilities rethinking
upgrade was a bill offered in November 2012 by Senator Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, to require warrants to gain access to email messages stored on private servers and to track
cellphones. Id. at 49. Although the proposed amendment enjoyed bi-partisan support, it did not make it
to the Senate floor for a vote before the end of the term. See Editorial Staff, Googling You, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2013, at SR 10.
State legislative efforts have fared no better. For example, the California legislature passed a bill
requiring a warrant to gain access to cellphone location records from carriers, but Governor Brown
vetoed the bill, saying that it did not strike "'the right balance between the operational needs of law
enforcement and individual expectations of privacy."' See Somini Sengupta, Courts Divided Over
Searches of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, at A3. Similarly, the Rhode Island legislature
passed legislation requiring a warrant to search a cellphone, but Governor Chafee vetoed it, saying
"'The courts, not the legislature, are better suited to resolve these complex and case-specific issues."'
Id.
The paucity of legislative efforts to rein in police surveillance can hardly come as a surprise. As
Anthony Amsterdam observed over a half-century ago (well before the onset of today's terrorist
threats):
The longtime, wholesale "legislative default" in regulating police practices is no accident.
Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to become sensitive to the
concern of protecting persons under investigation by the police. Even if our growing crime
rate and its attendant mounting hysteria should level off, there will remain more than
enough crime and fear of it in American society to keep our legislatures from the
politically suicidal undertaking of police control.
Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 378-379 (1958).
99 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964.
100 Id.
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the third-party doctrine by which sharing information with third parties
(e.g., sharing your location with your wireless provider by the wireless
signals from your cell phone to the provider) negates your reasonable
expectation of privacy in your location, even though this "sharing" is not
only technical at best but is necessary to the use of the phone. That would
help, but it would do nothing for other technological surveillance, both
extant (e.g., video monitoring, perhaps accomplished by drones) and future
technologies. It is time to consider a different approach, one that takes us
forward by going back to the Fourth Amendment itself.
III. A RETURN TO BASICS: A SEARCH IS A SEARCH IS A SEARCH 10 1
The Fourth Amendment protection is against unreasonable searches and
seizures conducted by the government and directed at persons, houses,
papers and effects.102 And, as the Court acknowledged in Kyllo, the
meaning of the word "search" remains pretty much the same today as it did
in the 18'h century, i.e., " '[t]o look over or through for the purpose of
finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the
house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.' "103 However, in breaking
the conceptual, property-based grip of physical trespass on what constitutes
a search, the Court in Katz and its progeny has become more focused on
what is revealed by an intrusion and less on the intrusion itself. Katz,
certainly Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court, could be read simply to
hold that an electronic intrusion, like its physical counterpart, is under the
above definition a search (for words spoken) and that a phone booth, during
the course of a telephone call, is a place analogous to a house or an effect.
Instead, Justice Harlan's privacy-based test has become the analytic
centerpiece, assessing the privacy interest in what was revealed by an
intrusion to decide if the intrusion was a search.
This may not be accidental or happenstance. If, as seems reasonably
straightforward, tearing open and sorting through a trash bag is a search -
an act by the police to "look through [the bag] for the purpose of finding
something" - then the question is, was it reasonable? Under current
doctrine, reaffirmed by Katz, this reasonableness question would
101 With apologies to Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily (1913), appearing in Geography and Plays
(1922) ("Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose."). Some things one needs no more than to say. Cf Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (in holding that an officer's moving of a stereo turntable to see its serial
number constituted a search, Justice Scalia intoned, "A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose
nothing but the bottom of a turntable.").
102 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
103 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n. I (quoting Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989) (emphasis in original)).
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presumptively be answered by requiring a search warrant. Or, if flying
over a fenced patio - an act by the police "to examine by inspection" what
is in the enclosed area - is a search, again, a warrant is presumptively
required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.
And so on. From that perspective, this reverse engineering of KatzlO4 is
understandable. First decide what the privacy interest is before deciding
whether to call the intrusion that revealed it a search, because if it is a
search, it will be subject to the presumptive warrant requirement. In effect,
this approach implements a two-stage reasonableness inquiry. If the
privacy interest revealed by a particular kind of search is relatively slight,
the search is deemed presumptively reasonable by employing the legal
fiction that it is not a search at all, thus avoiding any further reasonableness
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. If, on the other hand, the privacy
interest at issue is significant, the Court requires more to satisfy the
amendment's reasonableness command, presumptively a warrant.
This take on Katz is hardly new. Indeed, the justices themselves have
more or less acknowledged it. In Kyllo, which as noted above dealt with
visual surveillance of a house enhanced by a thermal imaging device,
Justice Scalia surveyed the Katz landscape, noting that while Fourth
Amendment coverage no longer depends on physical trespass, ordinary
visual surveillance remains categorically lawful under the Fourth
Amendment even though the original theory - that under the laws of
England, the eye cannot commit a trespass - no longer seems viable.
Justice Scalia noted that while the new theoretical justification for
permitting visual "searches" of things in public view would seem to be that
they are reasonable, the stated rationale under Katz is that they are not
searches at all, "perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact [the
Court's] doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively
unconstitutional."1 05 In dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Scalia's
assessment of Katz, even if he did not, openly at least, agree with the
reason for it. Justice Stevens cast the issue in terms of presumptive
reasonableness. He observed that warrantless searches inside a home are
presumptively unreasonable but that warrantless searches of "property in
plain view are presumptively reasonable," citing among other examples
"the search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage
104 Id. at 32.
105 Id. See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our
intricate body of law regarding 'reasonable expectation of privacy' has been developed largely as a
means of creating these exceptions [to the presumptive warrant requirement], enabling a search to be
denominated not a Fourth Amendment search and therefore not subject to the general warrant
requirement.").
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of a home" (Greenwood) and "the aerial surveillance of a fenced-in
backyard from the altitude of 1,000 feet" (Ciraolo).106 In this view, each
was a search that was presumptively reasonable, apparently due to the
Court's assessment of the privacy interests involved.
A somewhat different, but at bottom similar, approach seems at work in
Bond v. United States.10 7 There, the Court held that under Katz, an officer's
single squeeze of a canvas travel bag stuffed into the overhead
compartment on an inter-state bus constituted a search of the bag. The
squeeze revealed what the officer recognized to be a brick-shaped object
consistent with bulk cocaine, leading to a further search of the bag, which
confirmed that it was indeed cocaine. In arguing that the squeeze did not
constitute a search under Katz, the government pointed out that, by putting
his bag in a position that every bus traveler knows will subject it to the
"dog-eat-dog" pushing, pulling, prodding and squeezing by strangers in "a
world of travel that is somewhat less gentle than it used to be,"108 Bond
reasonably understood that his bag would be squeezed. He thus had no
actual, much less objectively reasonable, expectation of avoiding such a
squeeze.
The Court accepted that the suspect expected his bag to be handled, just
not in an "exploratory manner." 109 That was enough for the Court. In his
dissent, Justice Breyer argued that, except for its purpose - which under
Fourth Amendment doctrine cannot be taken into account' 10 - the officer's
squeeze was indistinguishable from the expected handling of the bag. 1"l
But the Court apparently decided that such bus surveillance went beyond
what was presumptively reasonable and required more to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment. Why? It did not say, but it had to be the privacy interests in
the general contents of one's luggage. 1' 2 The contents of a garbage bag
sitting at the curb for pick-up are not sufficiently private to require Fourth
Amendment justification, presumptively a warrant, for the police to rip it
open and examine its contents, but the contents of a canvas bag put in the
luggage rack of a bus are sufficiently private to require a warrant for the
police just to squeeze it in a manner that roughly reveals its contents. Put
on a constitutional continuum, the baggage squeeze is more like the
thermal scan of a house (at least before infrared thermometers became
106 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42 & n. 2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
108 Id. at 340 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 338-339.
110 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
Ill See Bond, 529 U.S. at 341-342 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112 See Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1977) (holding that because - unlike an
automobile - a footlocker is a repository of one's personal effects, a warrant is required to search it).
732 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:4
generally available) than the act of tearing open and rummaging through a
trash bag.
And in Jones, Justice Alito's analysis is consistent with, even if it does
not openly employ, this approach. He compares the "relatively short-term
monitoring of a person's movements on public streets" in Knotts with "the
use of longer term GPS monitoring" in Jones, monitoring that "for four
weeks... tracked every movement that [Jones] made in the vehicle he was
driving." The former was presumptively reasonable as measured against
societal expectations of privacy; the latter was not, at least in investigating
"most offenses." However, Justice Alito reserved judgment on whether
"prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations involving
extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally
protected sphere of privacy."11 3 It is difficult to understand how the
intrusiveness of the same investigative technique on privacy interests could
vary depending on the nature of the investigation in which they are
employed. Rather, it seems that Justice Alito is introducing the
governmental-need side of the interest balancing that informs
reasonableness analysis once it is divorced from the warrant presumption.
It may well be, as the Court has held in its analysis of seizures, that the
reasonableness calculus changes when the investigation involves a serious
national security threat or potential catastrophic threat,1 14 but that analysis
remains hidden, tucked away in the privacy focus of Katz.
Why worry, if the Court recognizes that these non-searches are really
searches (or even if it wants to pretend, as a legal matter, that they are not
searches)? This would hardly be the first legal fiction, and as long as the
Court makes the reasonableness determination, what is the difference?
There are several reasons for concern.
First, this two-stage reasonableness inquiry lacks transparency,
obscuring the analytic framework by which Fourth Amendment
reasonableness is determined. At best, this impedes the development of
coherent doctrine; at worst, it permits those with an agenda to do their work
behind closed doors.
Second, the first stage of this two-stage reasonableness inquiry - the
113 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
114 Cf Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-274 (2000) (in holding that, standing alone, an
anonymous tip that a particular person had a gun did not constitute reasonable suspicion to stop and
frisk that person, the Court qualified its holding, stating:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which
the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even
without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example that a report of a person
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for the report of a person
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.).
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Katz privacy test - is incomplete. To be sure, the privacy interest in
question is pertinent concerning whether an intrusion or surveillance
technique is reasonable, but that is only half the story. The other side of the
reasonableness balance has always been, and must be, the governmental
interest served by that search and the necessity of that search to advancing
that interest. In analyzing the reasonableness of searches in which the
Court has held that the warrant requirement is inapt, e.g., so-called special-
needs searches such as public-school searches' 15 and drug testing,' 16 the
Court has always balanced the privacy interest at stake against the
government's interest said to justify the search, including examining the
need for the search to advance that interest. 117 Either the Court is not
counting this in its threshold reasonableness calculus or it is assigning it
undisclosed weight. The closest a justice has come to openly considering
this side of the reasonableness balance in this threshold inquiry is Justice
Alito's suggestion that the GPS surveillance in Jones might not be a
115 New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557
U.S. 364 (2009).
116 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001);
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822 (2002).
117 For example, in Vemonia School Dist. 47J, the Court considered the constitutionality of
suspicionless, special-needs (i.e., non-law-enforcement) drug testing of public-high-school students
participating in interscholastic sports. In analyzing the reasonableness of this drug-testing program, the
Court looked first at the privacy interests of the students. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 654.
The Court examined the information revealed and the manner in which it was extracted, and then
balanced those privacy interests against the nature and immediacy of the governmental interests,
including the need for the testing program to meet those interests. Id. at 656-60. Ultimately, it
concluded that the drug testing was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 664-65.
This balancing approach is not confined to special-needs analysis. The existence and scope of
exceptions to the warrant requirement have long depended on such interest balancing. See, e.g., Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-768 (1969) (balancing the individual's right to privacy in his home
against the police officer's need to protect himself from a weapon and potential evidence from
destruction, the Court recognized and limited the scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest to the
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control). Indeed, despite protestations to the
contrary, the Court employed such balancing to justify suspicionless DNA testing of felony arrestees,
the stated purpose of which testing was to determine if those arrested had committed earlier unsolved
crimes. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). The testing was accomplished by a buccal swab
of the arrestee's inner cheek and subsequent lab analysis of the cells thus gathered. The Court went to
great length to characterize the testing program as a means of identifying those arrested, id. at 1970-77,
an administrative rather than a law-enforcement need. However, in his dissent, Justice Scalia makes
plain the implausibility of that claim, arguing that both on its face and in its operation the testing
program was designed to solve unsolved crimes, a pure law-enforcement need. Id. at 1982-89 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Whoever is right about the character of the DNA testing, and Justice Scalia's view
seems more persuasive, the Court's holding that such searches are reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment openly rests on balancing the arrestee's diminished expectation of privacy implicated by
such swabs coupled with the information revealed by subsequent lab analysis, id. at 1969-70, 1977-80,
against the government's interests in the resulting information and the need for such testing to get it. Id.
at 1970-77.
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cognizable search, i.e., might be presumptively reasonable, if it is
employed in investigating an "extraordinary crime." This would seem to
be a valid part of a reasonableness inquiry, but it is all sub rosa, hidden
away in the Katz test.
Third, this meat-axe approach, dividing searches between those that are
presumptively reasonable (thus requiring no justification) and those that
presumptively require a warrant to be reasonable, is inapt in the digital
world. The threshold judgment required by Katz depends on a judicial
assessment of privacy interests - a cloistered view at best - in a world in
which, at dizzying speed, technology is transforming societal notions of
privacy, if not eviscerating it altogether. If the justices decide, based on
who knows what, that an interest is sufficiently private, then - as matters
now stand - they are left with one choice, i.e., a search warrant is
presumptively required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement. Surely the various kinds of modem surveillance and the
purposes to which they are put do not fit neatly into one of these two
categories. We need a scalpel, not a meat axe.
Finally, and most important, this first-stage assessment of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness uses the wrong metric. Societal expectations
of privacy, even if the Court were competent at a given point in time to
judge them in this fast-changing digital world, cannot be the sole measure
of what is reasonable, even as a threshold matter. What we objectively
regard as private - information to which others do not have access - is an
ever-shrinking slice of our lives. But the fact that one's neighbor, or credit-
card company, or banker, or phone service provider might - of necessity or
even choice - know something about each of us does not mean that the
government should therefore have automatic access to that information.
The Fourth Amendment marks a line between the government and its
citizens, setting off a citizen's space that should, as a normative matter, be
free from unfettered governmental intrusion, surveillance. The concern is
not privacy as such but rather the government's ability forcibly or
surreptitiously to invade one's personal affairs. Perhaps no one has put it
better than Justice Brandeis in his famous Olmstead dissent:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right
to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
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valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means imposed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 118
The limitation which the Fourth Amendment imposes in protecting that
right to be let alone, while not absolute, is facially straightforward,
protecting us from unreasonable searches and seizures of our persons,
houses, papers and effects. We ought to take that seriously. Any
government activity the purpose of which is to gather information about its
citizens is a search and should thus be subject to the constitutional
command that it be reasonable. Period. Surveillance by GPS, by security
cameras, by drone aircraft, by everything from old-fashioned eye-ball
observation by a cop on the beat to computer-enabled collection of
metadata from private sources that have access to it - each is a search; each
is subject to the amendment's requirement that it be reasonable.
Plainly, this would be a bigger Fourth Amendment than we have now,
and it almost certainly would require re-thinking - or at least re-casting -
the interpretive approaches to defining the amendment's reasonableness
mandate. What might inform this reasonableness balancing? While, as
noted at the outset, it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully consider the
expanded reasonableness analysis for which I call, a few points seem worth
making.
IV. Fourth Amendment Reasonableness in a post-Katz World
The starting point for thinking about the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment command that searches be reasonable if "search" includes all
governmental investigative activity would be the presumption that to be
reasonable, a search must be justified by a warrant. After all, it is this
doctrinal mandate that appears to have engendered the two-stage
reasonableness approach of Katz. On its face, the Fourth Amendment
imposes no such requirement. All that the amendment mandates in this
regard is that searches and seizures be reasonable. The amendment
separately provides for the issuance of warrants, requiring that they be
based on probable cause under oath or affirmation and that they specify
with particularity the places to be searched and the items to be seized.
These separate textual commands have caused some to argue that
interpreting the amendment's categorical reasonableness requirement
presumptively in terms of a warrant turns the amendment on its head,
118 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
736 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol.27:4
allowing the amendment's limitations concerning the issuance of warrants
to predominate over its broader, reasonableness command. 119
Nevertheless, there are good reasons, jurisprudential and historical, that
support a warrant preference, certainly where core Fourth Amendment
values are at stake.
From a policy perspective, a warrant requirement ensures that searches
are justified based on a single, longstanding standard - probable cause; it
ensures antecedent justification for searches, based on a neutral
magistrate's determination of probable cause; it ensures that the basis for
that determination is reduced to writing under oath or affirmation, which
provides a record of the basis for that determination, permitting its
subsequent review; it ensures that those conducting the search are informed
of the particular limits on the scope of that search; it ensures that one
subject to such a search is given notice of the authority for and the limits of
the search. Taken together, these features of the warrant requirement
address the concerns that searches be for a proper purpose, tailored in scope
to serve that purpose, and that they not be arbitrary in either their initiation
or scope.
As for history, one need look no further than the observations of Felix
Frankfurter:
One cannot wrench "unreasonable searches" from the text and context
and historic content of the Fourth Amendment. It was the answer of
the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants
and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope. Both were deemed
unreasonable. Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of
119 Indeed, Telford Taylor makes a compelling argument that the framers of the Fourth
Amendment were principally concerned about warranted searches, seeing warrants as the problem
which the amendment is designed to cure rather than the answer to a broader concern that searches be
reasonable. As Professor Taylor puts it, summarizing the results of his historical inquiry regarding the
"original understanding" of the Fourth Amendment:
[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about
overreaching warrants [principally statutorily authorized "writs of assistance," issued by a
court and generally authorizing the bearer to enter any place, including houses, to search
for and seize "prohibited and uncustomed" goods]. It is perhaps too much to say that they
feared the warrant more than the search, but it is plain enough that the warrant was the
prime object of their concern. Far from looking at the warrant as a protection against
unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive
searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution in line with the stringent
requirements applicable to common-law warrants for stolen goods - an interesting use of a
practice already obsolescent to limit and mitigate a current and dangerous practice.
TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (Ohio St. U. Press 1969).
See also AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FIRST PRINCIPLES 4 (Yale U.
Press 1997) (arguing that reading the Fourth Amendment's two separate commands to provide that
"warrants are not required, but any warrant that does issue is per se unreasonable if not supported by
probable cause, particular description, and the rest . . . squares more snugly with the amendment's
specific words, harmonizes better with its historic context, and makes considerably more common
sense").
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those who framed them. 120
In spite of the warrant presumption's apparent advantages and pedigree,
it is fair to say that over the past century the Court has vacillated in its
allegiance to it. For the 50 years that preceded Katz, there was open
disagreement among the justices concerning the existence of a categorical
warrant requirement, some decisions recognizing it, others rejecting it.121
By the time of Katz, however, the presumption had prevailed, at least
rhetorically. 122
But no sooner had the Court recognized the warrant presumption's
ascendancy than it began to trim back its force, eventually recognizing a
score of exceptions to it, including many that directly impact core Fourth
Amendment values. So, for example, the Court has held that the following
warrantless searches of one's home are reasonable: the entry and search of
a suspected felon's home if he fled into it in response to police pursuit,123
the entry and search of a home based on consent either by a resident or by a
third party who has reasonably apparent authority to give such consent, 124
the search of the area within the immediate control of a person arrested in
his home, 125 the protective sweep of an arrestee's home if, in the course of
the arrest, officers have a reason to suspect that an armed confederate might
be in the home,126 the entry and search of a home if officers have a reason
to suspect that emergency assistance is required, 127 the entry and search of
a home for evidence of a crime if officers have probable cause to believe
120 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121 Compare Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring) (summarizing the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment decisions as "lurch[ing] back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone. (The opinions preferring a warrant involv[ing]
searches of structures.)" with id. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, particularly after World
War II and Justice Jackson's service as a special prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials, the Court had
consistently read the Fourth Amendment to impose a presumptive warrant requirement, for reasons of
both history and policy).
122 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("'Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate
of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,' and that searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." (citations omitted)); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (recognizing a presumptive warrant
requirement and narrowing the scope of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to it); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449, 453 (1971) (recognizing a presumptive warrant requirement in holding
that the warranted search of an automobile was unreasonable because the warrant was issued by the
state's attorney general and not a neutral magistrate).
123 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967) (decided a little over six
months before Katz).
124 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 185-186 (1990).
125 Chimel, 595 U.S. at 761.
126 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335 (1990) (also recognizing authority to search adjacent
spaces from which an attack might be launched, whether or not the officer had reasonable suspicion that
armed confederates were present).
127 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403-404 (2006).
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that such evidence is inside the home and have reason to suspect that
securing a search warrant would result in the destruction of the evidence,12 8
and the entry of a home by a welfare case worker to conduct an inspection
as a condition of continued receipt of welfare benefits. 129
Each of these exceptions to the warrant presumption is based on
balancing individual interests against competing governmental interests
implicated by the kind of search in question. Take for example searches of
private homes related to fire. A city-wide inspection program to ensure
compliance with a city's fire code requires a warrant, but it is an
administrative warrant that is less demanding than a traditional warrant.130
While an administrative warrant must be based on probable cause
demonstrated to a neutral official, this version of probable cause does not
require that the fire inspector demonstrate individualized suspicion of code
non-compliance. Instead, it requires only that the inspector satisfy the
issuing official that the inspection of the house in question is part of an
administrative inspection program which includes reasonable
administrative or legislative standards for conducting such searches.131
Given the limited privacy intrusion and the public need for such inspection
programs to prevent fires,' 32 the principal concern in this context is in
controlling the inspector's discretion and in providing adequate notice to
the homeowner of the inspector's authority to conduct the limited
inspection.133  In effect, this administrative-warrant approach, while
preserving facial allegiance to the warrant requirement, marks a departure
from it, one that is fashioned to address the particular Fourth Amendment
interests there at stake.
On the other hand, if a house is ablaze, fire-fighters need no warrant to
enter, forcibly if necessary, to fight the fire.134 This is no more than an
application of the familiar exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement in which the privacy interests in the house yield to the public-
safety interest in extinguishing the fire. Fire investigators may remain on
the premises without a warrant for a reasonable time after the fire has been
extinguished,135 reflecting the reduced privacy expectations of the
128 Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
129 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
130 Camara v. Municipal Ct. of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 439, 507 (1978).
131 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. Although it imposes a warrant requirement, the Court does not seem
to authorize forcible entry of a building even with a warrant in hand. Id. at 540.
132 Id. at 535-37.
133 Id. at 532-33.
134 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509.
135 Id.at510.
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occupants and the continuing public-safety interest at that point in ensuring
that the fire does not re-ignite and in determining its cause. But once
exigency is over and the investigators leave, if the home is in such
condition that its occupants retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in it,
the fire inspectors need either consent or a warrant to re-enter. 136 An
administrative warrant will do if the investigators' interest is to determine
the fire's cause and origin, the scope of that search being confined to
intrusions necessary to that purpose. 137 If, on the other hand, the purpose of
the search is to find and seize evidence of a crime, a traditional warrant
based on probable cause is required.138 Whether or not one agrees with the
particular interest balances struck in crafting these exceptions, each of these
departures from the traditional warrant requirement depend on balancing
the individual's interests - for the most part privacy but also freedom from
arbitrary exercise of official discretion - against the competing
governmental interests justifying the particular intrusion in question.
While the interest balance for many forms of surveillance might not
support the need for a warrant, there is no reason to think that the warrant
presumption applicable to entries into homes would change if Fourth
Amendment coverage expands to include all investigative techniques. The
suggested change certainly broadens what constitutes a search, but physical
intrusions into a home have always been regarded as searches, searches that
lie at the amendment's core. As to them, the presumptive requirement of
warrant would almost certainly remain undisturbed.
In contrast, many forms of surveillance have long been treated as beyond
the amendment's reach. Historically, before the 2 0th century's technology
revolution, surveillance basically meant visual or audio observation,
perhaps physically enhanced by binoculars or the like. Because Fourth
Amendment searches were then defined exclusively in terms of property-
based notions of trespass, this surveillance remained outside the
amendment's coverage under the theory that the eye (and presumably the
ear) can commit no trespass.139 As we have seen, all of that purported to
change under Katz, which abandoned this trespassory approach to Fourth
Amendment coverage.140 Yet visual surveillance - whether with the naked-
136 See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
137 Id. at 294 (to secure such a warrant, the investigators "need only show that a fire of
undetermined origin has occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed search is reasonable
and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy, and that the search will be executed at a
reasonable and convenient time").
138 Id. at 295.
139 See supra note 56.
140 But see Jones, supra notes 65-66 & accompanying text, resurrecting this approach.
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eyel 4l or enhanced by technology, at least commonly available
technologyl 42 - remains beyond Fourth Amendment regulation, because,
depending on how one views Katz, such surveillance either is not a search,
or it is a search that is presumptively reasonable. 143
This would of course change if all forms of surveillance, from naked-eye
observation to surveillance accomplished by the most sophisticated
technology, are recognized as searches. But just because a mode of
surveillance is covered by the Fourth Amendment does not mean that the
warrant presumption should automatically apply. Some forms of
surveillance may be so invasive that a presumptive warrant requirement
would be appropriate almost without regard for the need for such
surveillance. The government's collection and storage of digital metadata
might be a good candidate for a presumptive warrant requirement, given
the government's ever-growing technological capacity not only to collect,
store and retrieve such data, but to analyze those data in a way that permits
increasingly accurate identification and real-time tracking of particular
individuals, including prediction of their future movements.144 In contrast,
it may be that other, less-invasive technological surveillance for which
there is demonstrated need that a warrant requirement might impede would
not require a warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement.
Consider a thermal scan of a house like that employed in Kyllo, which at
bottom was no more than technologically enhanced visual surveillance. All
that the scan revealed about Kyllo's house was the relative temperatures of
various parts of its roof, which in turn suggested that certain interior spaces
in the house were hotter than others. Even assuming that this information
would have been unavailable unless agents entered the house, as a matter of
common sense this does not justify treating these two searches - forcible
entry versus an infrared roof scan - the same, requiring a warrant for each.
Putting aside the trauma produced by a forcible entry and focusing just on
privacy interests, a scan reveals heat emanating from various parts of the
141 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213, discussed supra notes 36-37 & accompanying text.
142 Compare Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238 (use of sophisticated but publicly available
(albeit very expensive) mapping camera did not constitute a search); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
739-740 (1983) (use of flashlight did not constitute a search) with Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (use of a
thermal-imaging scanning device not in general public use constituted a search).
143 See supra notes 104-114 & accompanying text (discussing alternative view of Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test).
144 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, How the U.S. uses Technology to Mine More Data More
Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at 11 (describing a new technology, trilaterization, that "allows
tracking of an individual's location, moment to moment. The data, obtained from cellphone towers, can
track the altitude of a person, down to the specific floor in a building. There is even soft-ware that
exploits the cellphone data seeking to predict a person's most likely route.").
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house whereas physically entering the house and roaming from room to
room to determine the temperature of each necessarily reveals both
contents and activities in the house. To be sure, Justice Scalia is correct in
pointing out that the heat rising through the roof permits inferences about
the activities within - perhaps including the time at which the "lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath"145 - but that does not justify equating
the intrusiveness of a thermal scan with a full-blown search of the house.
Of course, the intrusiveness of a search is only half the story. The
reasonableness balance includes the law-enforcement interest served by the
search, including the need for the search in advancing that interest.
Thermal scans such as those employed in Kyllo are used to detect patterns
of heat emanation consistent with indoor marijuana cultivation, a relatively
serious felony in most jurisdictions. While there certainly are other means
of detecting evidence of this illegal activity, this investigative technique,
narrowly tailored to its purpose, permits law enforcement officers quickly
and efficiently to confirm or dispel suspicions of such illegality and is thus
a useful law-enforcement technique for which there would appear to be no
ready substitute.
What would be the costs and benefits of requiring a search warrant in
this context? As noted above, one potential benefit of a warrant is limiting
the search's scope to the particular areas and particular items to be seized
authorized by the magistrate based on the probable cause demonstrated in
the warrant application. That limitation can be quite important in cabining
officers' discretion if they enter and search a house, but a thermal scan is
by nature limited in scope, and so the warrant would do little in this
regard. 146 Presumably, a warrant would permit scanning the roof for
infrared radiation, which is all that the scanner does. To be sure, a warrant
would limit the discretion of the officers concerning what roof could be
scanned and when that scan could be performed, but requiring officers to
have individualized suspicion of marijuana cultivation as a predicate to a
roof scan would provide a similar, though concededly less protective,
limitation concerning which roof could be searched. Further, given the
non-disruptive character of a roof scan - the occupants of the house would
likely be unaware of its occurrence - the timing of the search would seem
less important than the timing of a physical search of the house to
determine the temperature of the house's various rooms, and there would
seem to be no need to inform its occupants of the authority for a search of
145 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
146 Cf King, 133 S.Ct. at 1969 ("The need for a warrant is perhaps least when the search involves
no discretion that could properly be limited by the 'interpo[lation of] a neutral magistrate between the
citizen and the law enforcement officer.") (citation omitted).
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which they are unaware.
Of course, the main benefit of a warrant lies in the level of suspicion
required to justify a search, probable cause, and the imposition of a neutral
magistrate as the arbiter of probable cause, thus providing for a
determination that the search is justified before it occurs and for a record of
the basis for that determination that permits subsequent review. But this
assumes that probable cause is the appropriate level of certainty required to
justify this search. That may be so, but the cost of requiring probable cause
- and with it a warrant - to justify a roof scan is to eliminate it as an
investigative tool. If the officers have probable cause to believe that there
is marijuana cultivation within a building, they would not need a thermal
scan to confirm that fact. Rather, they could secure a warrant authorizing a
physical search of the premises for the marijuana. A warrant requirement
in this context does not simply ensure that it is the neutral magistrate rather
than the officer who determines that the search is justified; it ensures that
no such search will occur. Given the interest balance involved, the cost of
the extra protection provided by a warrant requirement may be too high. If
that were so, it would not mean that thermal scans should be considered
presumptively reasonable; it would only mean that the warrant presumption
would be inapt for such surveillance.
Other forms of surveillance seem similarly, or almost certainly, inapt
candidates for a warrant presumption. At one extreme would be naked-eye
surveillance by a beat cop standing in a public place. The intrusiveness
side of the reasonableness balance is here far less weighty than those
searches at the core of Fourth Amendment values, and the law-enforcement
need for such traditional surveillance seems beyond question. And, even
more than is so with thermal scans, it is difficult to see what function a
warrant would serve. The observations of the cop on the beat, while
searches, would seem to be presumptively reasonable, requiring no
particularized justification to make them so. This presumptive
reasonableness would be consistent with historical treatment of naked-eye
observation, i.e., it is per se permissible, but the normative justification for
this presumption would be that, while a search, the public need for such
unfettered investigative observation outweighs any individual interest in
avoiding it or in subjecting it to further constitutional oversight.
The same might not be so for surveillance more intrusive than the
observations of a cop on the beat, whether or not the surveillance employs
technology that is commonly available. Consider GPS surveillance
conducted by monitoring tracking devices that were either factory- or
owner-installed, that is, GPS surveillance that does not involve a trespass to
chattels and is thus not covered by Jones. On the one hand, as the
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government argued in Jones,147 this surveillance does no more than
monitor and catalog the public whereabouts of the person who possesses a
particular device, something that a properly positioned law enforcement
officer (or team of officers) could theoretically observe. If such public
observations by police are presumptively reasonable, the sum of those
presumptively reasonable searches - more efficiently executed and
accurately recorded by technology - is also presumptively reasonable. On
the other hand, as Jones argued,14 8 the matrix of precise information that
four-week around-the-clock GPS surveillance yields is very intrusive,
going well beyond public travel, revealing a great deal about the private life
of the person who is subjected to the surveillance. This mode of
surveillance is more intrusive than a beat cop's observations, or even a
thermal scan of a house, but it is not clear that it matches the intrusiveness
of searches that justify a warrant presumption.
Turning to the government side of the balance, the public-safety need for
such surveillance, GPS tracking has potential application in a broad range
of law-enforcement activities, ranging, for example, from tracking
suspected drug dealers to tracking suspected terrorists plotting to use a
weapon of mass destruction, one of Justice Alito's "extraordinary
offenses."1 49 Depending on the use to which it is put, there could be
substantial law-enforcement need for such surveillance in circumstances
that a warrant requirement might thwart, perhaps because of the probable-
cause requirement or because of difficulties in readily securing a warrant.
Maybe, on balance, a warrant presumption would over-protect individual
interests and under-value legitimate governmental interests in long-term
GPS surveillance. Maybe a more reasonable accommodation of those
competing interests would be to require a reasonable suspicion to justify
such searches. Maybe the tracking of cars is sufficiently public that neither
a warrant nor individualized suspicion is necessary. Maybe the most
pressing concern is that the information thus gathered, stored and cataloged
could be misused, a concern that might be addressed by requiring police
regulations governing its retrieval and use, which regulations could be
reviewed by a court utilizing particular criteria to ensure that the
regulations and their enforcement are adequate to protect against abuses of
discretion.150 But maybe the warrant presumption is the appropriate
measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, relying on exceptions to
147 See Brief for Petitioner at 17-33, United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
148 See Brief for Respondent at 24-30, United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
149 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at964.
150 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-533.
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the warrant requirement to suit particular applications for which a warrant
is not suited (like Justice Alito's "extraordinary offenses"), much as is so
with the warrant requirement currently in place.
However any of these examples of interest balancing might play out, the
point is that once Fourth Amendment coverage is broadened to include all
means of gathering information, the presumption of a warrant should not
reflexively be the starting point in deciding whether or not a particular
mode of search is reasonable. For traditional, physically invasive searches
of houses or their analogs, the warrant presumption and its various
exceptions are likely appropriate and thus would likely remain unchanged.
So, too, highly invasive technological surveillance such as the National
Security Agency's reported collection and analysis of metadata might
require a warrant. However, for less-intrusive modes of search, it may be
that the particular balance of interests suggests utilizing reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause to justify the search. Alternatively,
particularly where the Fourth Amendment concern is as much for the
potential abuse of official discretion as for the justification of the search,
the interest balance may suggest an altogether different approach to
defining reasonableness, perhaps one employing police rulemaking
"created and maintained in working order [] by the stimulation and
oversight of the courts enforcing constitutional law," as suggested by Prof.
Amsterdam over 50 years ago.'51
Conclusion
This suggested departure from the warrant presumption is one steeped in
caution. I am mindful of the potential pitfalls once one departs from the
warrant presumption, with its familiar, built-in requirement of probable
cause as a measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Defining Fourth
Amendment protection by interest balancing is dangerous business. One
need look no further than Justice Douglas's warning in Terry that without
the "ring of certainty" provided by the deeply rooted requirement of
probable cause, "powerful hydraulic pressures" grounded in apparent
necessity will "bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional
guarantees and give the police the upper hand." 152 Whether Justice Douglas
was correct in his prediction of loosened guarantees in stops and frisks,153
151 See supra note 98 Amsterdam, PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 58 MINN. L.
REV. at 380.
152 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
153 Statistics, at least, tell a story of widespread and apparently disproportionate stops and frisks of
African-Americans and Hispanics in New York City. According to data that the Center for
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it is surely true that the standard bearers for individual rights are, for the
most part, criminals who seem unworthy beneficiaries of limitations on
governmental law-enforcement efforts. And, it is equally true that the
government side of the balance is easy to over-value, particularly in an age
of seemingly ubiquitous terrorist plots (punctuated by reported close calls
and infrequent but tragic attacks), while the privacy-liberty side of the
balance may seem an extravagance, particularly to those who cannot
picture themselves subject to such investigative attention. Finally, any
such interest balancing cannot be ad hoc. It must yield rules that are
sufficiently clear to permit those who are bound to follow them - law-
enforcement officials, lawyers and judges - to know what they mean and to
consistently apply them.
That said, if we are to face up to the challenges that advancing
technology poses to Fourth Amendment protection, it is essential that we
do so in transparent terms. This means, as I have argued, that we recognize
all information gathering by the government for what it is - a search -
which would permit assessing the reasonableness of all modes of
surveillance. That assessment would require a careful and sophisticated
balancing of interests, a balancing that a presumptive warrant requirement
would hamstring if not foreclose. If we insist on applying this presumption
beyond the searches for which it is the apt measure of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, the result will be distortions of Fourth Amendment
doctrine, like Katz's pretense that certain searches are not "searches," in a
clumsy and indirect effort to correct the reasonableness balance. 154 Given
Constitutional Rights obtained from the city, of the 1.2 million persons that NYC police officers
stopped in 2011 through 2012, 84% were either African-American or Hispanic, even though these two
racial cohorts combine to make up only 52% of the City's population. See Bill Weir & Nick Capote,
NYPD 's Controversial Stop-and-Frisk Policy: Racial Profiling or 'Proactive Policing'?, ABC NEWS
NIGHTLINE, May 1, 2013, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/nypds-stop-and-frisk-policy-racial-
profiling-proactitve/story?id=19084229. Statistics, of course, are contextual, and then-NYPD
Commissioner Raymond Kelly defended the stop-and-frisk policy, arguing that, because almost three-
quarters of the persons described to the police as perpetrators of violent crimes were described as being
African-Americans, if anything African-Americans were being, in his words, "under stopped." Id.
Whoever has the better of this statistical argument, most African-Americans who have been repeatedly
stopped and frisked in New York do not feel "under stopped." Id. (17-year-old Brooklyn man
describing his fear during the seven stops-and-frisks to which he says he has been subjected in his
neighborhood). They likely would agree with Justice Douglas that their constitutional guarantees have
been "watered down." And maybe then some.
154 A good example of this phenomenon is Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013), in which, as
noted and discussed supra note 117, the Court upheld a program of warrantless DNA testing of felony
arrestees. Plainly mindful of the presumption that law-enforcement searches for evidence must be
supported by a warrant, the Court went to great length to characterize the testing program as a means of
identifying arrestees, id. at 1970-77, an administrative rather than a law-enforcement need. However, in
his dissent Justice Scalia exposed the implausibility of that claim, pointing to record evidence that, both
on its face and in its operation, the testing program was designed to solve unsolved crimes, a pure law-
enforcement need. See id. at 1983-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court's strained insistence that the
state's interests were administrative and not law-enforcement - all to avoid the warrant presumption -
undercuts both the analytic force of the opinion and the credibility of the Court as a principled decision
746 JOURNAL OF CML RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPAENT [Vol. 27:4
the stakes, we cannot afford to trade one distortion for another.
maker.
